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Name, Shame, and Then Build Consensus? Bringing 
Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights 
Stephan Sonnenberg  
James L. Cavallaro  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, clinics in both international human 
rights and dispute resolution have proliferated in the U.S. legal 
academy. While the combined number of these clinics in top 
American law schools was in the single digits a quarter century ago, 
at this writing all but a few of the top twenty-five law schools and 
more than three-fifths of the top fifty schools now have clinical 
programs in at least one, if not both of these areas.
1
  
Beyond the legal academy, in the past twenty years, human rights 
and conflict resolution have become two of the leading approaches (if 
not the leading approaches) to situations involving conflict, rights 
abuse, and mass atrocity around the world.
2
 That law schools now 
 
 
 
Clinical Lecturer, Founding Staff Attorney, International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School. 
 
 
Professor of Law, Founding Director, International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School. The authors wish to thank the participants of the 
Washington University Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Program Scholarship Roundtable, 
New Directions in Negotiation and Dispute Resolution for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. In particular we thank Professor Karen Tokarz for encouraging us to participate in 
the Washington University conference and for sharing with us some of her experiences teaching 
at the intersection of rights advocacy and dispute resolution. Her comments, and those of the 
other participants, proved enormously constructive in the drafting of this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, YALE LAW 
SCHOOL, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/AllardKLowensteinIHRC.htm; International 
Human Rights Clinic, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/ 
clinics/ihrc.html. This figure is the result of the Authors‘ research about the clinical offerings of 
each of the top fifty law schools, according to the US News & World Report ranking (full 
research findings on file with authors). This research was conducted by the authors in April, 
2012. 
 2. David Kennedy, for example, notes that ―As a dominant and fashionable vocabulary 
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seek to train graduates in these areas is, we argue, a salutary though 
somewhat delayed development. 
Despite the potential applicability of dispute resolution and human 
rights approaches to similar problems, to date, these two sub-
disciplines have developed on parallel tracks that have rarely, if ever, 
intersected. Within law schools, clinical education in human rights 
and dispute resolution has developed in separate programs. The two 
clinical areas have independently responded to some of the 
deficiencies of traditional litigation-centered law school clinics. Both 
dispute resolution and human rights work address means of 
engagement outside the traditional litigation context. As such, they 
have sought to broaden legal education beyond the classic case study 
method, complemented by engagement in real-world projects. While 
on parallel paths, both dispute resolution and human rights clinics 
have developed similar, unconventional pedagogies.
3
  
The division between these fields reflects and amplifies, to a 
significant degree, the historic tensions between professionals in 
these fields. Speaking in generalities, these actors have worked 
separately, frequently believing their approaches to be incompatible. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the perceived (and often real) 
tensions between these two fields has been the ―peace versus justice‖ 
debate. In its simplest, most irreconcilable form, the clash between 
conflict resolution advocates and rights practitioners posits that 
situations of conflict can either be managed by accommodating all 
parties (including rights abusers) or, instead, by advocating justice 
(that is, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of rights 
advocates) regardless of the consequences. One manifestation of 
these competing views was an exchange of articles in Human Rights 
Quarterly in 1996–1997.4 The first, anonymously-penned piece 
accused human rights activists of undermining the chances for a 
 
for thinking about emancipation, human rights crowds out other ways of understanding harm 
and recompense.‖ David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (Spring 2002). 
 3. Many assertions in this article, particularly those having to do with the state of human 
rights and dispute resolution law clinics in U.S. law schools, are based in large part on the 
authors‘ personal knowledge. 
 4. See Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 249–51 
(1996). 
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negotiated end to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian conflict, thereby 
prolonging the conflict, costing months of violence and unnecessary 
rights abuse.
5
 The piece provoked an equally vigorous response by 
Felice Gaer, arguing that rights advocacy and justice for victims 
should not be subject to the whims and compromising rhetoric of 
international diplomacy.
6 
A few years later, in 1999, David Rieff 
raised this tension in the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, 
questioning whether rights advocates were prolonging the war and 
slaughter in that country by challenging amnesty.
7
 Subsequent events 
would demonstrate that Rieff‘s critique was premature.8 
In recent years, though, dispute resolution experts have 
incorporated core human rights principles into their work.
9
 While this 
has been done haltingly, there are clear signs that the rhetoric of 
protecting human rights has penetrated the field of dispute 
resolution.
10
 By contrast, human rights theoreticians still tend to view 
 
 5. See id.  
 6. See Felice D. Gaer, UN-Anonymous Reflections on Human Rights in Peace 
Negotiations, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 8 (1997). 
 7. See David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 
8, 1999, at 37. 
 8. Since the publication of Rieff‘s article, not only has the conflict in Sierra Leone 
abated, but some analysts have even suggested that Sierra Leone has witnessed ―the invention 
of human rights ‗from below.‘‖ See Steven Archibald & Paul Richards, Converts to Human 
Rights? Popular Debate about War and Justice in Rural Central Sierra Leone, 72 AFR.: J. 
INT‘L AFR. INST. 339, 340 (2002).  
 9. See, e.g., Véronique Dudouet & Beatrix Schmelzle, Towards Peace with Justice, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION, THE CHALLENGES OF JUST PEACE, 9 
BERGHOF HANDBOOK DIALOGUE SERIES 5, 5–14 (Véronique Dudouet & Beatrix Schmelzle 
eds., 2010). 
 10. For a selection of academic commentaries on the impact of the Human Rights 
discourse on the practice of conflict resolution, see e.g., Safia Swimelar, Approaches to Ethnic 
Conflict and the Protection of Human Rights in Post-Communist Europe: The Need for 
Preventive Diplomacy, 7 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POL., 98–126 (2001); B.G. Ramcharan, 
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 4 HUM. RTS L. R., 1–18 (2004); Negotiating Justice? 
Human Rights and Peace Agreements, 2006, International Council on Human Rights Policy, 
Versoix, Switzerland; Hurst Hannum, Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuiling, 28 
HUM. RTS. Q. 1–85 (2006); Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: The Challenges of Just 
Peace, Handbook Dialogue Series #9 (Véronique Dudouet & Beatrix Schmelzle eds., 2010); 
see also Guidelines for United Nations Representatives on Certain Aspects of Negotiations for 
Conflict Resolution, 2006 UNITED NATIONS JURIDICAL Y.B., 496–97, available at http://www 
.un.org/law/UNJuridicalYearbook/index.htm (laying forth the need for UN-sanctioned peace 
negotiators to consider themselves bound by human rights norms as they mediate international 
disputes). 
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their field as intellectually separate from dispute resolution.
11
 Clinical 
legal education trails behind this multidisciplinary scholarship.  
This Article examines the reasons behind the tensions that 
continue to make integration of these two approaches so difficult. It 
seeks to interrogate the status quo, with a focus on law school clinics. 
We believe that many complex human rights problems that would 
traditionally be addressed separately by human rights and dispute 
resolution practitioners would benefit from a more integrated 
approach. As a consequence, the training of practitioners would also 
benefit from a pedagogy that incorporates elements of both 
disciplines. By taking a step back from the existing structure of 
clinics and turning to the goals that they seek to achieve, we argue for 
a new model that brings together skills and approaches from 
traditional human rights and conflict resolution approaches to 
develop a hybridized model of practice.
12
 This Article recognizes the 
inroads that human rights discourse and practice have already made 
in conflict resolution. It thus focuses primarily on the contributions 
that conflict resolution can make to human rights approaches. This 
year, at Stanford Law School, the authors of this Article have begun 
the process of launching just such a human rights and conflict 
resolution clinic. This Article seeks to explain the background, 
objectives, and future prospects for this and similar clinics. 
The Article considers three representative case studies. These 
cases come from the authors‘ personal experience working in Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or clinics devoted to either 
human rights or conflict resolution. We chose the examples not only 
to illustrate typical scenarios in which a hybridized practice of human 
rights and conflict resolution proved to be either absent or effective, 
but also to highlight three prominent tensions that we believe any 
 
 11. For one scholarly article attempting to highlight the relevance of conflict resolution 
methods on the practice of human rights, see Eileen Babbitt‘s contribution The New 
Constitutionalism: An Approach to Human Rights from a Conflict Transformation Perspective 
to Human Rights and Conflict Transformation, supra note 10, at 67.  
 12. We note here that while we identify integrated approaches to human rights and 
conflict resolution clinics, including concrete proposals in specific contexts, this Article is 
intended as an inquiry rather than a solution. In this regard, many of the suggestions are based 
on our concern that we—as insulated or one-dimensional practitioners—have failed to provide 
the best possible representation to our clients, communities, and partners. Our proposals are as 
frequently based on our mistakes as our successes. 
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human rights project incorporating conflict resolution skills will face: 
(1) the tension between skepticism vs. optimism; (2) the tension 
between signaling strength vs. inviting collaboration; and (3) the 
tension between maintaining relationships vs. demanding critical self-
analysis. Our analysis of the three case studies provides a description 
of how we managed these tensions in our projects and proposes 
several benefits from the perspective of a human rights practitioner 
on an integrated approach. The Article concludes by outlining the 
structure and pedagogy of our clinic, the type of projects we select, 
and the ways we hope to document our success (and shortcomings) as 
the years progress. 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
The classic human rights approach is characterized by actions: (1) 
to document abuses convincingly; (2) to work to prevent further 
abuse; and subsequently (3) to hold accountable those responsible for 
abuses.
13
 Once rights abuses have been established, traditional rights 
advocacy focuses on efforts designed to investigate, prosecute, and 
punish wrongdoers and seek compensation for victims. Rights 
advocates routinely engage justice mechanisms—domestic 
investigations, prosecutions, international oversight bodies, and 
quasi-judicial and judicial structures-in order to seek accountability 
for past abuses. Because these institutions alone often fail to 
vindicate the rights of the oppressed, rights practitioners and rule of 
law consultants also frequently seek to intervene on a systemic level 
to improve the capacity of those judicial remedies to operate more 
effectively. Still, at the end of the twentieth century, one of the major 
focus areas of the human rights movement remained advocacy for the 
creation and strengthening of such judicial remedies, both at the 
domestic and increasingly at the international levels.  
Looking beyond the legal system, the signature advocacy 
methodology of the human rights movement has been to ―mobilize 
shame,‖ that is, to embarrass abusers and thus stop violations, while 
 
 13. See, e.g., David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 8, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/08/magazine/the-
precarious-triumph-of-human-rights.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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forcing investigations and prosecutions of those responsible. 
Compensation for victims is, to some extent, an afterthought. As 
Kenneth Roth wrote in describing the methodology of Human Rights 
Watch, the essence of human rights work is the ―shaming 
methodology—the[] ability to investigate misconduct and expose it to 
public opprobrium.‖14 He continues, stating that ―the core of our 
methodology is our ability to investigate, expose and shame. We are 
at our most effective when we can hold governmental (or, in some 
cases, nongovernmental) conduct up to a disapproving public.‖15 
Looking further at the practice of many prominent human rights 
organizations, the ―disapproving public‖ mentioned by Kenneth Roth 
also deserves to be more carefully defined, since it is usually the 
public and politicians of wealthy and influential countries in North 
America or Europe that find themselves to be the targets of human 
rights awareness-raising campaigns about rights abuse in other 
countries. As Tom Farer observed: 
From its inception, the international human rights movement 
has operated on the assumption that the most important means 
for improving the behavior of delinquent regimes is 
international public opinion. Although human rights activists 
often refer merely to the ―shaming effect‖ of exposure, as if a 
government shown to be torturing and murdering its opponents 
may experience a kind of moral epiphany or at least be 
embarrassed into less malignant behavior, their lobbying 
efforts imply and their private conversations often confirm 
belief in a more complex chain of causation. While hoping to 
trigger pressure from morally sensitive and influential sectors 
within the target state, in most instances the real targets of 
shaming campaigns are citizens of liberal democratic 
countries.
16
 
 
 14. Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues 
Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 67. 
 16. Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a 
Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 517 (1997). This being the case, it is easy to see 
how the public in these countries has come—improperly, might we add—to perceive human 
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Of course, human rights approaches may be far more varied than 
this Manichean description. Indeed, Kenneth Roth has come under 
attack for the implicit conclusion of his argument that the 
methodology employed by Human Rights Watch ought to be the 
main methodology of rights advocates more generally.
17
 Human 
rights practitioners may seek to influence and develop public policies, 
work to promote greater understanding and acceptance of difference, 
and so on. This may involve action before domestic or international 
bodies in each phase of an advocacy effort: identifying and 
documenting the rights violations, ending the abuse, and seeking to 
bring about prosecution and punishment. The fact-finding to 
document rights abuse is often done by local NGOs, sometimes 
acting in partnership with international NGOs.
18
 Activists may seek 
to pull power levers at the local, national, or international level. 
Similarly, criminal prosecutions or civil trials seeking to hold rights 
abusers to account may take place at the local, national, or 
international level. In situations where formal prosecutions are either 
unlikely or difficult, alternative forms of punishment may involve 
lustration (where officials of a perpetrating regime are removed from 
office), de-licensing, social ostracism, or measures of establishing the 
truth about the past and recognizing victims—such as truth 
commissions, indemnification schemes, and the creation of memory 
 
rights as a discourse to describe all the terrible things happening ―out there‖—far removed from 
domestic shores—in the wild and barbarous lands of the unknown abroad. 
 17. See, e.g., Letter from William F. Schulz, former Executive Director of Amnesty 
International, to Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 15, 2002) (on 
file with authors); Alicia Ely Yamin, The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the 
Defense and Promotion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human 
Rights Agenda, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1200, 1223–25 (2005). 
 18. Human Rights Watch, for example, explains on its website how it ―partner[s] with 
local human rights groups, making detailed recommendations to governments, rebel groups, 
international institutions, corporations, policymakers, and the press to adopt reforms.‖ 
Frequently Asked Questions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/75138 (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2012). The Danish Institute for Human Rights makes its reliance on local 
partnerships even more explicit. ―The partners are equal, but have different roles in the 
partnership. . . . The local partner contributes with knowledge of the national context, including 
of human rights in the national context. . . . In return, the Institute provides international 
expertise on human rights, organisational and strategic skills and access to donors and 
international networks. The Institute may also offer training and capacity building.‖ DANISH 
INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.humanrights.dk/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).  
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sites.
19
 However, throughout all of these various activities the 
unifying objective of human rights advocates is the intent to identify, 
document, halt, and punish abuses.  
Essential to this succinct description of traditional human rights 
advocacy is that in all elements described above, the human rights 
advocate represents the interests of the victim or society in justice. 
The rights advocate is involved in an adversarial context, if not an 
adversarial process, in which she must advance the human rights 
cause, or more specifically help secure the individual rights of the 
victim (or potential victim) of abuse. Any success by the rights 
advocates implies a retreat by the forces responsible for rights abuse: 
thus a classic zero-sum view of the world. 
III. THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH 
The above description of the human rights approach contrasts with 
an equally oversimplified conflict resolution approach,
20
 in which the 
practitioner jettisons an advocacy agenda in favor of a more 
facilitative role.
21
 Many conflict resolution practitioners are in fact 
called neutrals—so important is the notion that they not appear 
biased towards any party to a conflict.
22
 Their neutrality, however, 
 
 19. For a full assessment of the transitional justice measures employed across a range of 
nations in the Americas and Eastern Europe, see AFTER OPPRESSION: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Vesselin Popovski & Monica Serrano eds., 2012). 
 20. To keep our terminology inclusive and accessible to lay people, students, and 
professionals from other disciplines, we have chosen the term ―conflict resolution‖ to 
encompass what other scholars might term ―conflict management‖, ―conflict transformation,‖ 
or even ―peace-building.‖ To help us justify this definitional sleight of hand, allow us to make 
reference to Professor Schneider‘s article in this volume. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, 
Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 13 (2012).  
 21. It is important to note that here we are describing the role of the ―neutral‖ or process 
manager. In describing the ―conflict resolution approach,‖ we might also have focused on the 
role of an advocate engaged in such a non-adversarial dispute resolution process (a lawyer 
representing parties in a mediation, for example), in which the advocate would also have to 
modulate her advocacy strategy to account for the more collaborative process. We believe, 
however, that the true pedagogical power of exposing our students to both the human rights and 
the conflict resolution approaches lies in having them stretch their thinking precisely beyond the 
bounds of typical advocacy roles. Similarly, we see many advocacy projects where, either by 
design or happenstance, human rights advocates find themselves engaging in process 
management, either internally within a coalition or even between disparate stakeholder groups 
in a community, and thus it is those process facilitation skills that will prove relevant. 
 22. For a fascinating early debate on this issue, see the exchange between MIT Professor 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/9
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does not reflect an ignorance of the very real moral and ethical issues 
at play in many disputes. Instead, it reflects a principled commitment 
to a process whereby the protagonists themselves must develop 
shared normative agreements about how to manage their conflict 
more constructively. A facilitative conflict resolution practitioner 
typically insists that the issues to be resolved in any dispute are 
defined by the parties themselves, and that the informed consent of 
the parties is sufficient to justify any compromises that may be 
necessary to reach agreement—even if these compromises are 
inconsistent with competing norms (such as human rights, for 
example).
23
 Thus, even if a peace agreement requires a temporary 
suspension of human rights norms, this could be justified if the 
involved parties agree that the benefits of peace make the tradeoff 
worthwhile. For example, a conflict resolution practitioner trained in 
facilitative mediation should not object, as a matter of principle, to an 
amnesty for perpetrators of mass violence, or a decision to allow 
those who benefited unjustly from a past era of enforced racial 
inequality keep the spoils of that past policy, as long as the parties 
who agreed were fully empowered and informed about their decision. 
 
Lawrence Susskind proposing a mediation model in environmental disputes, whereby mediators 
should be held accountable for the substantive outcomes they help facilitate and responsible for 
ensuring that those outcomes are fair. See Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and 
the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). This model of a non-neutral mediator is 
critiqued by Professor Joseph Stulberg of CUNY, who claims that neutrality and impartiality 
are the essence of mediation, and thus not to be tinkered with. See Joseph B. Stulberg, The 
Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981). 
 23. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Ellen Waldman, Identifying the Role 
of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1996–
1997), in which Waldman presents a three-tiered typology of mediation practice divided with 
respect to how the mediator positions him or herself vis-à-vis social norms. According to that 
typology, the most commonly taught form of mediation, which she terms the ―norm-
generating‖ style of mediation, requires that the mediator leave it to the parties to jointly agree 
on the norms that will guide the mediation. Id. at 707–08. This style is contrasted with the 
―norm-educating‖ style of mediation (in which the mediator makes available to the parties 
relevant norms that might guide the mediation), see id. at 727, 738–42, and the ―norm-
advocating‖ style of mediation, in which the mediator insists that the mediated outcome be 
consistent with important social norms, see id. at 742–53. Waldman‘s analysis of the ―norm-
educating‖ and ―norm-advocating‖ styles of mediation are instructive for many of clinical 
projects; however, they rely on the mediator having some standing, usually in the form of 
parties being either forced or pressured into a mediated solution—a condition that is not always 
the case in situations of actual or potential human rights abuse. 
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This agnosticism about the outcome of a conflict can be 
contrasted with the very strongly held views that a typical conflict 
resolution practitioner would have about procedural justice (i.e., 
what makes a dispute resolution fair from the perspective of the 
parties involved). One strand of dispute resolution practice—
commonly referred to as dispute systems design—is built around the 
idea that properly designed conflict resolution processes should allow 
parties in a dispute to think ―outside the box‖ as they generate 
sustainable solutions to their disputes.
24
 In addition, dispute systems 
design is premised on the notion that a well-designed conflict 
resolution process allows parties to resolve their differences without 
compromising their ongoing relationship.
25
 Conflict resolution 
experts thus see themselves as process experts who do their utmost to 
improve communication between conflicting parties as they search 
for solutions to their mutual problems.
26
 Unlike the typical human 
rights advocate, a conflict resolution practitioner will dwell on the 
past only insofar as it must be discussed in order to turn the parties 
towards a more forward-looking, problem-solving stance. 
Accountability is treated as a joint problem for both the 
―perpetrators‖ and the ―victims‖ to discuss and resolve. In fact, in 
some restorative processes, terms such as ―perpetrator‖ and ―victim‖ 
are often avoided entirely in order to minimize the divisiveness 
incumbent in the use of such terminology.
27
  
 
 24.  See WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETT & STEPHAN GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES 
RESOLVED: DESIGN SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT. (PON Books, 1993); CATHY 
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS (Jossey-Bass, 1996); Khalil Z. Shariff, Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict: 
Principles of the Problem Solving Organization, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 133, 133–57 (2003). 
 25. See supra note 24. 
 26. See Eileen Babbit, supra note 10. 
 27. The debate over the use of terms such as ―victim‖ or ―perpetrator‖ goes beyond the 
scope of this Article, but has strong echoes in the literature on restorative justice processes, in 
which victims and offenders are asked specifically to confront one another, and more 
specifically one another‘s narratives, by way of developing empathy for each other. See, e.g., 
Janine P. Geske & India McCanse, Neighborhoods Healed Through Restorative Justice, 15 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 16. Human Rights activists, of course, need to define 
―perpetrators‖ in order for their traditional toolbox to find success, since it would be impossible 
to name and shame someone whom you have not first defined as a rights violator. At the same 
time, of course, it is difficult if not impossible to avoid engaging with perpetrators—or at least 
their erstwhile supporters—in a post-conflict situation. For this reason alone, human rights 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/9
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Of course, just as was the case for the brief description of human 
rights practice above, this description fails to recognize the breadth of 
conflict resolution practice. Good conflict resolution practitioners go 
to great lengths to allow parties to ―empower‖ themselves to equalize 
the power dynamics at the table,
28
 and most practitioners will shy 
away from endorsing or facilitating patently unjust or immoral 
outcomes to a negotiation. That said, conflict resolution focuses not 
so much on outcome as on process,
29
 coupled with the fundamental 
belief that all individuals—even those who in the past may have 
violated others‘ human rights—are capable of handling future 
conflicts peacefully and constructively. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINICS 
At this writing, nineteen of the top twenty-five law schools (as 
ranked by U.S. News & World Report) boast human rights clinics; 
and one of the six schools without a clinic was developing a human 
rights center and clinic at this writing.
30
 By and large, these clinics 
focus on documentation, report writing, domestic litigation (generally 
 
practitioners have a lot to learn from the experiences and scholarship of the restorative justice 
movement. 
 28. For an instructive description of the micro-skills a mediator can use to achieve such 
strategic empowerment in pursuit of a fair outcome, see Sara Cobb, Empowerment and 
Mediation: A Narrative Perspective, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 245, 247–49 (1993). 
 29. Eileen F. Babbitt, The New Constitutionalism: An Approach to Human Rights from a 
Conflict Transformation Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: 
THE CHALLENGES OF JUST PEACE, 9 BERGHOF HANDBOOK DIALOGUE SERIES 67, 68 
(Véronique Dudouet & Beatrix Schmelzle eds., 2010), available at http://www.berghof-hand 
book.net/documents/publications/dialogue9_humanrights_complete.pdf. 
 30. See generally Best Law Schools, US NEWS EDUCATION, http://grad-schools.usnews 
.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited May 
1, 2012) (The nineteen law schools ranked among the top twenty-five U.S. law schools by US 
News and World Report in 2013 with human rights clinics are: Yale, Stanford, Harvard, 
Columbia, NYU, University of California-Berkeley, University of Pennsylvania, University of 
Virginia, Northwestern, Cornell, University of California–Los Angeles, University of Texas-
Austin, University of Southern California (Gould), University of Minnesota–Twin Cities, 
George Washington University, University of Washington-Seattle, and Emory University. Two 
law schools (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor and Georgetown) had clinics focusing on 
areas that fall under the broad umbrella of human rights (human trafficking and women‘s 
human rights, respectively), but exclude other human rights issues. At the time of publication, 
Duke was in the process of developing a HR clinic); see also Kathleen Kelly Janus & Dee 
Smythe, Navigating Culture in the Field: Cultural Competency Training Lessons from the 
international Human Rights Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 445, 483–85 (2011–12). 
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invoking the Alien Tort Statute
31
 and/or the Torture Victim 
Protection Act,
32
 amicus curiae submissions), and engagement with 
international oversight and quasi-judicial and judicial bodies.
33
 Some 
of these clinics have resources that allow them to travel abroad, thus 
facilitating their work with partners in regions and countries in which 
abuses occur or are threatened.
34
 Those law schools engage students 
in fact-finding (interviewing victims, witnesses and other 
stakeholders, visiting sites of abuse, etc.), as well as networking and 
other work done during on-site visits.
35
 Other clinics focus on work 
that can be done from the home institution (legal research, drafting of 
memoranda, preparing amicus briefs).
36
 All human rights clinics 
engage students in desktop research, whether legal or factual or 
both.
37
 Most, if not all, involve students in developing strategies to 
advance the interests of their clients.
38
 Almost without exception, the 
point of departure (and the point of conclusion) for projects in human 
rights clinics are the concerns of a particular set of stakeholders, 
usually victims or potential victims of human rights abuse.  
Clinics generally include a seminar that involves skills 
development and, frequently, analysis of the methods and practices of 
the human rights movement. These seminars involve readings and 
discussion, as well as clinical rounds or other means of considering 
projects and issues that arise in the course of these projects. Review 
of the available syllabi of these clinics does not demonstrate a focus 
on conflict resolution either in selected readings or topics.
39
  
 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009). 
 32. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009)). 
 33. See supra note 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human 
Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT‘L LAW 505, 532 (2003). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See supra note 3. 
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V. CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINICS 
At the time of this writing, fourteen of the top twenty-five U.S. 
law schools (as ranked by U.S. News & World Report) have 
dedicated conflict resolution clinics of some sort.
40
 The majority are 
traditional mediation clinics, in which students learn the basic skills 
of third party neutral process management.
41
 These clinics often place 
students in small claims courtrooms where they help parties resolve 
their disputes amicably and sustainably.
42
 These kinds of experiences 
are usually supplemented by in-class simulations or, in some cases, 
advanced mediation opportunities in which students work with 
parties to a dispute over the course of several weeks or months to 
resolve more complex disputes. Other clinics ask students to apply 
dispute resolution strategies in areas of the law that lend themselves 
to less adversarial modes of engagement. Examples of this model 
include clinics focusing on landlord-tenant disputes or community 
development, in which students are encouraged to explore alternative 
dispute resolution methodologies in addition to traditional court-
centric approaches.
43
 Still other clinics take a more systemic 
approach to dispute resolution, focusing on organizational designs 
intended to help people use interest-based or less costly means of 
resolving their disputes.
44
 
The skills seminars accompanying conflict resolution clinics 
usually feature a mix of interactive simulations that allow students to 
 
 40. The fourteen law schools ranked among the top twenty-five US law schools by U.S. 
News and World Report in 2013 with dedicated conflict resolution clinics are: Stanford, 
Harvard, Columbia, NYU, University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, University of 
Michigan–Ann Arbor, Northwestern, University of California–Los Angeles, University of 
Minnesota–Twin Cities, George Washington University, University of Washington–Seattle, 
University of Notre Dame, and the University of Washington–St Louis.  
 41. See supra note 3. 
 42. See supra note 3. 
 43. See, e.g., The Landlord-Tenant Clinic, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
academics/1215.htm (last visited May 1, 2012), or the Civil Rights, Community Justice and 
Mediation Clinic, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://law.wustl.edu/clinicaled/ 
(last visited May 1, 2012).  
 44. For example, the Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program at Harvard 
Law School, as well as informal student practicums with conflict resolution professors at 
Stanford Law School. See, e.g., Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinic, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/clinics/hnmcp.html (last visited May 
1, 2012).  
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practice facilitation. These simulations provide students with instant 
feedback on the experience from colleagues and instructors. Some 
syllabi expose students to the broad and growing range of so called 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (―ADR‖) processes that have 
emerged over the years (for example, arbitration, mediation, private 
adjudication, negotiation, and the many hybrid processes that mix 
these elements).
45
 Others focus on particular ADR methods, for 
example mediation or arbitration. For example, a mediation course 
might allow students to experiment with a range of mediation 
styles—from the rigidly process-oriented ―facilitative‖ style to the 
more directive approaches in which the mediator inserts her 
substantive opinion into the process. Most syllabi also include micro-
skills exercises (such as active listening) that can help facilitators do 
their work more effectively.
46
 Again, a review of the available syllabi 
reveals a narrow focus on dispute resolution processes without much 
consideration of how a conflict resolution practitioner should position 
herself vis-à-vis the underlying substantive or normative claims 
driving the dispute.
47
  
VI. THE REAL WORLD 
Whether by choice or as the result of increasingly vocal concerns 
by activists and victims, the practice of conflict resolution has already 
hybridized significantly in the past two decades, and is now much 
more consistent with the aims and practice of human rights than 
when the field was first formed.  
Some of this shift was due to a recognition of the positive 
contributions that the conflict resolution approach can have on the 
human rights agenda. The argument most frequently heard to this 
effect is that no social processes can be more violative of human 
rights than war, and thus, efforts to end or prevent wars contribute 
directly to human rights protection.
48
 While perhaps true empirically, 
 
 45. See, e.g., Dispute System Design: Seminar, Harvard Law School, 2010 Syllabus (on 
file with authors).  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; see also supra note 6. 
 48. For a recent example of such an argument, see John Tirman, Op-Ed., The Forgotten 
Wages of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at A23. 
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such arguments are little more than a rhetorical repackaging of what 
conflict resolution practitioners do already, since they do not suggest 
any changes in how ADR practitioners should go about their work. 
As such, they do not entail a methodological shift, but instead only an 
additional endorsement of the importance of the work. 
A more foundational shift has also taken place, however, in how 
practitioners understand situations of systemic rights abuse. Such 
situations are increasingly understood as grand societal negotiations 
over access, resources, and power gone terribly wrong. According to 
this view, victims or marginalized communities somehow lost their 
capacity to negotiate for their own socio-economic, civil, political, or 
cultural well-being.
49
 In order to ―rebalance‖ such dysfunctional 
systems, therefore, these marginalized stakeholders must regain their 
negotiation effectiveness. It is this capacity building agenda that 
many conflict resolution theorists have begun to address. This 
conceptualization, which of course is prone to the critique that it can 
be used to ―blame the victims‖ for their own misfortune, can also be 
used to think creatively of ways to ―empower‖ those victims to 
advocate and lobby more effectively on their own behalf.  
At its core, the belief in strategically empowering certain 
marginalized stakeholders embroiled in conflict for them 
independently to break the logjam preventing agreement is premised 
on the same rationale that has for centuries animated diplomats to act 
as international conflict intermediaries. This realpolitik mindset is 
perhaps best exemplified by Henry Kissinger‘s approach to mediation 
and his influence in facilitating the Camp David accords between 
Israel and Egypt, with the sole difference that instead of waiting for 
the parties to empower themselves, Kissinger leveraged the resources 
and political capital of the United States to force a new settlement.
50
 
Typically, this kind of power-broker-mediation diplomacy is only 
possible if the mediator represents the interests of a very powerful 
 
 49. See, e.g., Alicia Ely Yamin, The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the 
Defense and Promotion of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human 
Rights Agenda, 27 HUM. RTS. Q., 1200 (2005).  
 50. William Smith, Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 363, 369 
(1985). In a different context, it has also been articulated by Larry Susskind, when he 
highlighted the effectiveness of a politician with ―political clout‖ who used that power to 
mediate an environmental dispute near Denver. Susskind, supra note 22, at 42. 
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entity—such as the United States in the above example—willing to 
commit its power in order to persuade other parties to reach 
agreement.
51
 The underlying rationale is the same as that of the 
empowerment-focused capacity builder, in that both approaches 
believe that a solution to a conflict may emerge simply by 
rebalancing the power equilibrium between the parties to a conflict. 
The notion of ―rights education as empowerment‖ is perhaps the 
most profound way in which conflict resolution practitioners and 
human rights activists can join forces and facilitate both more 
sustainable and more rights-consistent outcomes. Rights-education 
work done by human rights activists need not be at cross-purposes 
with the efforts of process facilitators. To the contrary, having an 
effective rights-education effort as part of a conflict resolution 
process allows the facilitator to focus more centrally on process 
management. When victimized stakeholders are properly represented 
in a conflict resolution process and adequately empowered to voice 
their concerns effectively, the process facilitator can rely on the 
parties themselves to make decisions about how to deal with rights 
abuse as part of any negotiated settlement. In theory at least, the 
parties themselves will also presumably be able to make their own 
decisions on when it is in their interest to exit the process entirely if 
they feel their rights would be better served by another process. The 
key to this symbiosis between human rights advocates and conflict 
resolution practitioners in the above scenario is that neither 
misrepresent the other‘s role to the parties. In other words, while it is 
helpful for a human rights practitioner to educate a victimized 
community about their rights, whether that same rights practitioner 
should stand in the way of a negotiated outcome that does not live up 
 
 51. That said, even much less powerful interveners than diplomats have begun trying 
strategically to influence the topography of power among stakeholders involved in conflict. 
Track two diplomatic efforts (peace-building exercises with socially or politically influential 
members of society on both sides of a conflict), for example, are in practice thinly veiled 
attempts to strengthen pro-peace political constituencies on both sides of a conflict in advance 
of formal ―track one‖ negotiations. For a fascinating example of a very low-power facilitator (at 
least in terms of the kind of power that states typically wield)—an ecclesiastic Italian 
community of lay persons called the Communità di Sant‘Egidio—managed to bring to a close 
the vicious civil war in Mozambique. At the time (in 1992), that war was one of Africa‘s most 
gruesome and vexing internal armed conflicts. See Mario Giro, The Community of Saint Egidio 
and its Peace-Making Activities, 33 INT‘L SPECTATOR 85 (1998). 
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to her ―purist‖ vision of human rights is another matter. On the other 
hand, while it is perhaps role-appropriate for a facilitative mediator to 
refrain from exerting pressure on the parties to commit to the 
mediator‘s preferred negotiated outcome, it would be inappropriate 
for that same mediator to seek to restrict parties‘ access to 
independent counsel and human rights education.  
Traditional (i.e., non-neutral) advocates have also learned to 
promote the benefits to their clients of engaging in non-adversarial 
dispute resolution processes, even when there are strong legal rights 
that they might claim in a formal adversarial process. This is 
especially true for situations in which the parties in conflict either 
will not—or cannot—terminate their relationship to one another, 
even after the conflict is resolved.
52
 In the same way that the lawyer 
for one party in a collaborative divorce proceeding can help her client 
achieve a better negotiated outcome by informing her of her rights 
(which she might claim in a court-based proceeding),
53
 a human 
rights activist can give new focus to a community suffering from 
human rights violations merely by creating awareness about the 
existence of those rights. Professors Robert Mnookin and Lewis 
 
 52. Examples include a divorcing couple that—even after the divorce is finalized—will 
continue having to work together to make decisions about child custody, alimony, and child 
support logistics, and possibly maneuver any mutual friendships so as to minimize the ongoing 
hurt of a dissolved relationship. Similarly in situations of violent conflict, most societies do not 
have the option of permanently segregating conflicting ethnicities from one another in 
perpetuity following a conflict. This is not to say that it has never been tried before. After 
WWII, individuals of German ethnicity were forced to go to Germany and leave their 
traditional homelands across Eastern Europe—in response, of course to the near annihilation of 
persons of Jewish heritage across the region and especially in Germany, with large numbers of 
those few survivors of the Holocaust subsequently leaving either to the United States, Israel, or 
other recipient countries. Similar efforts to ―ethnically cleanse‖ territories of minority 
ethnicities occurred more recently following the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia 
and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to some extent also motivate the politics of a two-
state solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Some might 
also argue that a conflict-avoidance mentality underlay the racist historical policies separating 
blacks from whites in the United States under segregation and in South Africa under apartheid. 
While the contexts and histories of each of these events are wildly divergent, one commonality 
is that for all of them the relationships between the conflicting parties—even badly damaged 
ones—continued to exist, and continued to require careful management post-conflict. Thus 
none of these ―successful‖ separation efforts actually achieved what its architects had hoped—
namely to ‗solve‘ a problem (however morally repugnant it was to label ethnic coexistence as a 
―problem‖ in the first place). 
 53. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985 (1978–1979). 
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Kornhauser dubbed this phenomenon ―bargaining in the shadow of 
the law‖ in 1979.54 The term has retained its vitality and relevance. 
For example, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the first Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), uses it today to describe the 
potential of his judicial institution to transform international conflicts 
merely by virtue of introducing a rights framework into the way local 
stakeholders think and talk about justice.
55
 Indeed, one of the authors 
of this Article witnessed firsthand the profound change in how 
communities in northern Uganda resolved their disputes once the ICC 
began its investigation into the serious crimes allegedly perpetrated 
by the Lord‘s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, and how the 
language of human rights and dignity re-emerged as an important 
discourse even in situations that did not involve war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.
56
  
The second way in which the practice of human rights has 
influenced conflict resolution is by ―politicizing‖ the practice of 
conflict resolution.
57
 In fact, as Michelle Parlevliet points out, 
conflict dynamics are often inextricably linked to patterns of ongoing 
human rights abuse.
58
 It is often impossible to tell whether a specific 
instance of human rights abuse (for example, an act of torture at Abu 
Ghraib) is a contributing factor to future conflict or the product of 
ongoing and unresolved conflict (or both).
59
 On the one hand, the acts 
of torture perpetrated by American forces were the symptoms of a 
larger conflict, perhaps the ongoing stress of war on both the U.S. 
forces and the people of Iraq. At the same time, however, the images 
of torture at Abu Ghraib enraged millions of viewers both in Iraq and 
 
 54. Id. at 968. 
 55. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int‘l Criminal Court, Keynote Address at the 
Council on Foreign Relations 9–10 (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/international-
law/prepared-remarks-luis-moreno-ocampo-prosecutor-icc/p21375. 
 56. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
LORD‘S RESISTANCE ARMY (2006). 
 57. See the Dudouet and Schmelzle–Berghoff edited volume, in which Parlevliet has her 
article. Infra note 58. 
 58. Michelle Parlevliet, Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights 
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: THE CHALLENGES OF JUST 
PEACE, 9 BERGHOF HANDBOOK DIALOGUE SERIES 15, 18–21 (Véronique Dudouet & Beatrix 
Schmelzle eds., 2010), available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/ 
dialogue9_humanrights_complete.pdf. 
 59. Id.  
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around the globe, and sowed the seeds of hatred, enmity, and 
misunderstanding for years to come. Parlevliet argues that human 
rights activists tend to focus more on human rights abuses that are the 
symptoms of conflict, whereas conflict resolution practitioners (or 
conflict transformation practitioners, in Parlevliet‘s terms), focus 
more on the causes of conflict.
60
 According to Parlevliet, therefore, a 
hybridized practice of conflict resolution would devote energy to 
stopping those rights violations that occur as symptoms of conflict 
(for example, through ceasefires, peacekeeping, human rights 
monitoring, etc.) while also proactively trying to secure a positive 
peace that will prevent the underlying conflict from resuming in the 
first place (for example, by encouraging institution building, 
equitable and sustainable development, etc.).
61
 This latter activity is 
built around a profoundly political agenda, in that it seeks to redress 
the inequality and prejudice that often motivate conflict.  
The final way in which the practice of conflict resolution has 
changed as a result of (or perhaps always has been shaped in light of) 
human rights considerations has been in the gradual emergence of 
mediation or process facilitation ethics. The debate over self-
regulating the practice of mediation—especially in contexts in which 
significant social harm can come from mediated solutions that 
disregard the interests of key (often disempowered) stakeholder 
groups—stems at least from the early 1980s, if not before.62 One 
recent example are the guidelines—initially confidential but later 
made public by a document—that the Office of the United Nations 
Secretary-General distributed to all of its special rapporteurs engaged 
in facilitating non-violent agreements to end international conflicts.
63
  
 
 60. Id. at 24–25.  
 61. Id. at 24.  
 62. Compare Susskind, supra note 22, with Stulberg, supra note 22, in which Professors 
Susskind and Stulberg debated whether mediators in environmental mediations should be held 
to account for the fairness (or lack thereof) of the outcomes they broker. For a more 
contemporary example of an attempt to define professional standards in the context of 
mediating armed conflict, see Hugo Slim, Towards Some Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice 
in Third Party Mediation in Armed Conflict, OSLO FORUM (2006), http://www.osloforum.org/ 
sites/default/files/TowardssomeEthicalGuidelinesforGoodPracticein3rdPartyMediationinArmed
Conflict.pdf.  
 63. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidelines for United Nations Representatives on Certain 
Aspects of Negotiations for Conflict Resolution, unpublished internal memorandum (1999), 
reprinted in 2006 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 496-97, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.1. 
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In this document, UN-affiliated mediators are instructed that 
―disputes should be settled in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law,‖64 and that, if the circumstances so 
require, the mediator ―may need to acquaint the parties to a conflict 
with the existence of a body of international law and practice 
regarding these issues.‖65 If even such educative measures fail—for 
example, if negotiating parties continue to insist on granting amnesty 
to former combatants or government officials alleged to have 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity—the mediator 
must make the negotiators aware of the fact that the UN may not 
endorse such an agreement, and would likely actively withdraw its 
assistance and condemn the agreement publicly.
66
 Similarly, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 asserts that women should be 
included in peace negotiations. This Resolution has led to a series of 
recommendations to process facilitators on how to amend their 
standard operating procedures accordingly in order to be more gender 
inclusive.
67
 Such efforts increasingly place an important professional 
limitation on mediators‘ ability to proclaim absolute neutrality with 
regard to the substance of conflicts implicating human rights. 
 
 64. Id. at 496. 
 65. Id. at 497. Note how closely this language hews to Professor Waldman‘s description 
of a ―norm educating‖ mediation practice, supra note 23, in which the mediator is mandated to 
make the parties aware of relevant social norms that the parties themselves might otherwise be 
tempted to ignore. 
 66. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 61, at 497. Note how at this point, the 
mediator is instructed to push even further the limits of neutrality, and assume Professor 
Waldman‘s ―norm advocating‖ mediation style, supra note 23. 
 67. S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000); see also the report by the 
Institute on Quiet Diplomacy providing guidance to mediators on how to proceed in light of 
UNSC Res. 1325; for example, it states that ―the third party actor often has sufficient influence 
to establish parameters for dialogue, and an interest in ensuring that all key groups (and groups 
within groups) are represented,‖ and that there is a suggestion that ―the UN Secretary General, 
or heads of other leading inter-governmental organizations such as the African Union, include 
gender issues in the mandate of their appointed envoys, special representatives and mediators.‖ 
KRISTEN DEREMER & CRAIG COLLINS, INITIATIVE ON QUIET DIPLOMACY, SCR 1325 AND 
WOMEN‘S PARTICIPATION: OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE 
PROCESSES 25, (2010), available at http://www.iqdiplomacy.org/. 
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VII. RETHINKING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY‘S TRADITIONAL 
RESISTANCE TO THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODUS OPERANDI 
Human rights practitioners, by contrast, have been more resistant 
to adapting their tactics in light of the conflict resolution approach. 
The reasons are varied. Central to rights activists‘ disinclination to 
embrace dispute resolution principles is the idea that human rights are 
absolute and thus must be respected and applied at all times by all 
parties. The resistance to conflict resolution in the clinical field may 
also be related to the fact that most human rights clinics are housed in 
law schools, which ordinarily focus on the study of legal doctrine in 
absolute rather than on relative terms—as rules that must be applied, 
rather than as norms that constitute just one element among many in 
complex social systems. 
There are several reasons to rethink the human rights movement‘s 
traditional resistance to principles and methods of conflict resolution. 
First, the discourse of human rights has grown enormously over the 
past quarter century. From economic, social, and cultural rights, to 
corporate social responsibility, to developing nations‘ right to 
development, to environmental protection, a broad range of social 
issues and actors now fall under the broad mantle of human rights. 
Some of these more recent expansions of the human rights corpus are 
still considered by many—including most lawyers—to be 
aspirational in nature,
68
 and thus less appropriate for ―naming and 
shaming‖ strategies.69 
 
 68. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
states that each ―State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps . . . to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures,‖ and thereby sets forth the principle of the progressive 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added). This language 
can be contrasted with the corresponding language in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which states that in the context of civil and political rights, States 
must ―undertake[] to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.‖ Id. at 53. 
 69. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues 
Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004). 
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Despite what skeptics often contend,
70
 in many cases these rights 
are attainable; corporations do on occasion commit to voluntary 
codes of corporate social responsibility and nations do agree to 
binding curbs on their greenhouse emissions.
71
 But only rarely are 
these victories won by lawyers acting alone in traditional legal fora.
72
 
Much more frequently, they are the result of affected communities‘ 
mobilization efforts and strategic engagement with other stakeholders 
in society to secure their rights. In other words, victories with regard 
to social, economic and cultural right may often only be possible only 
if activists weave together legal and conflict resolution strategies in 
their approach.
73
  
Moreover, they should be seen as interest-based or problem-
solving negotiation efforts, and thus very different from the 
adversarial model for securing rights. If rights activists wish to push 
for compliance with the entire corpus of human rights, then they 
should expand their methodological repertoire to include more 
collaborative methods—ones that will force human rights 
practitioners to engage with the same individuals or constituencies 
with whom they might otherwise have simply written off as 
―perpetrators.‖74 
 
 70. Aryeh Neier is often cited as a leading human rights advocate of the position that only 
civil and political rights are human rights. In his memoir, he defends his view that 
―[a]uthoritarian power is probably a prerequisite for giving meaning to economic and social 
rights,‖ since in his view there are no other ways to force those with resources and power to 
relinquish those assets as a matter of right. ARYEH NEIER, TAKING LIBERTIES: FOUR DECADES 
IN THE STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS xxix–xxxii (2003). 
 71. See, e.g., Kyoto protocol (and Copenhagen follow-up conference) as well as the 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), http://www.eicc.info/ or Fair Labor 
Association (FLA), http://www.fairlabor.org/. 
 72. See, e.g., Yamin, supra note 17, at 1220 (discussing the struggle of a rural community 
to achieve its right to have access to emergency obstetric care). 
 73. In her article, Yamin describes successful strategies to secure economic, social, and 
cultural rights in Latin America, focusing in particular on efforts by NGOs to make real the 
concept of popular ―participation‖ in decision-making processes, as well as strategic 
partnerships between human rights NGOs and social movements. Id. at 1235–42. 
 74. What we present here as an innovative suggestion for clinic design is, in practice, 
already being done routinely by many rights activists around the world, especially those seeking 
pragmatic solutions to rights abuse in their own communities. This pragmatism has not yet, 
however, made its way prominently into much of the high-profile advocacy of international 
human rights organizations—with some notable exceptions—and thus the need to work with 
perpetrators and their support groups in the search for solutions to human rights problems often 
gets overlooked in descriptions of successful human rights advocacy strategies. 
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Parallel to the growth of the rights discourse that embraces new 
types of aspirational rights, the effectiveness of traditional legal 
remedies to secure first generation civil and political rights is also 
shrinking, as has the potential ―shaming‖ power of naming a rights 
violation. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century—either 
willingly or begrudgingly—most states committed themselves 
publicly to the human rights cause, opening the door for human rights 
activists to ―scor[e] points‖75 by comparing the lofty commitments of 
politicians with the actual facts on the ground.
76
  
This situation changed for much of the world in the post-
September 11 environment, as the national security discourse tends 
today to overshadow human rights concerns when the two conflict. 
Witness, for example, the emergence in the United States of a debate 
over the ethics of torture in the context of efforts to constrain 
terrorism, and the re-legitimization by scholars
77
 and politicians
78
 of 
the view that it is acceptable to torture in defense of national security. 
Prior to September 11, the overwhelming majority of rights activists 
would have believed that the question of whether it is ever 
appropriate to torture would be a definitive and resounding ―no.‖ 
As noted above, the clinic we are building at Stanford Law School 
seeks to change assumptions about the process of achieving rights. 
To start, we explore the implications of this changed perspective on 
the process of rights achievement in the context of three case studies. 
 
 75. NEIER, supra note 70, at 188. 
 76. See, e.g., id. (discussing attacks on Reagan administration‘s support of dictators after 
its declaration of promoting democracy internationally). 
 77. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 
2002, at A19. 
 78. See, e.g., the nationally publicized Republican primary debate in Spartanburg, S.C., on 
November 12, 2011, in which Herman Cain and Michele Bachmann, both one-time front-
runners for the Republican nomination for the Presidency of the United States, stated publicly 
that they would reinstate the use of waterboarding to obtain information from suspects in the 
war on terror. CBS News/NJ Debate Transcript, Part 1, CBS NEWS, Nov. 13, 2011 (Nov. 13, 
2011, 2:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505103_162-57323734/cbs-news-nj-debate-tran 
script-part-1/. 
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VIII. THREE CASE STUDIES: HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTITIONERS IN 
NEED OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS 
As explored above, the traditional adversarial model of mobilizing 
shame is, at least on its face, in tension with dispute resolution and 
consensus building approaches. If the ideal means of halting abuses is 
to embarrass publicly those responsible for abuse, then rights activists 
should focus on documentation and shame mobilization. In this case, 
they have no need to develop negotiation and dispute resolution 
skills. And, in practice, this has largely been the case for human 
rights advocates. Their training has been and continues to be 
primarily in documentation and advocacy. Not surprisingly, senior 
professionals in many leading human rights organizations are 
frequently lawyers, areas studies experts, and journalists.
79
 Among 
these three groups, those trained in law school (the majority in major 
international human rights NGOs) are most likely to have focused on 
adversarial, rather than consensual, approaches to resolving 
conflict.
80
  
Yet, in practice, even groups whose approach is adversarial 
frequently find themselves in situations in which they are forced to 
resolve disputes through participatory, consensus-building processes. 
Unfortunately, when asked to do so, advocates must rely on 
something other than their law school training. Consider the 
following examples: 
A. Case Study #1: Traditional Human Rights Advocacy Efforts are 
Successful and Your Counterpart Has a Change of Heart 
A national human rights organization in Brazil works with a local 
rights group in the northeastern part of the country on a matter 
involving inadequate police investigation into a series of gruesome 
murders. The killings, of which more than two dozen have been 
documented in one poor section of São Luís, Maranhão, target young 
 
 79. See supra note 3. 
 80. See William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. 
Shulman, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2007).  
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boys. Their bodies are found mutilated, with similar marks of sexual 
abuse. State authorities fail to take necessary measures to investigate 
the killings in compliance with Brazilian and international norms. 
Federal authorities seek to intervene to assist in the investigations, 
but the local governor (and candidate for national office) acts to 
block the federal engagement. The national and local rights groups 
file a petition with the Inter-American Commission on behalf of three 
of the victims. After years of litigation, a new government is elected 
in Maranhão state. Seeking to make a clean break with prior 
administrations, they offer to negotiate a friendly settlement with the 
victims‘ representatives to be brokered by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. As part of the settlement, they offer 
to pay indemnification to the families of all the victims, thirty-one in 
all. During the negotiations, tension arises over the method used to 
adjust the monthly compensation to be offered each family.
81
 
B. Case Study #2: Traditional Human Rights Advocacy Efforts are 
Either Unsuccessful or Less Successful and Collaborative 
Negotiation Represents the Best (or Only) Way Forward 
A human rights clinic assumes the representation of a traditional 
community whose lands are threatened by a major development 
project. The rights clinic is engaged in supporting litigation in the 
country, which has stalled. In meetings with leaders and residents in 
the community, the clinic discovers that some traditional landowners 
are interested in engaging the company to obtain compensation for 
their lands. The clinic offers to assist these residents in structuring 
and implementing a dispute resolution process with the company. 
C. Case Study #3: Your Own Constituency is Itself Partially 
Contributing to a Human Rights Problem 
A major multinational corporation engaged in the extraction of 
raw materials in sub-Saharan Africa (―Corporation‖) wishes to avoid 
a potential legal and public relations disaster that befell its competitor 
 
 81. See Emasculated Children of Maranhão v. Brazil, Cases 12.426 and 12.427, Inter-Am. 
Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 43/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 (2006). 
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company after human rights lawyers accused it of complicity in 
serious human rights violations related to its operations in the region. 
In response, the Corporation decides to engage in vigorous and 
proactive community development in the region in which it operates.  
Soon after the launch of the program, however, the Corporation 
realizes that the local governance capacity of the communities is 
weak at best, and that key stakeholder groups such as women, 
minorities, and children are usually excluded from discussions on 
how to allocate the Corporation‘s development funds. In response, 
the Corporation invites outside consultants—some of them traditional 
human rights advocacy groups engaged in corporate social 
responsibility efforts—to help encourage its community negotiation 
counterparts to become more responsive to the needs of the entire 
communities they represent. By doing so, the Corporation hopes that 
any development funds it spends will have a greater chance of 
reaching their intended recipients. 
All these matters are ones in which one of the authors of this 
Article was either directly involved in representation of the victims or 
a stakeholder through either an NGO or law school clinic. In the first 
two examples, the practitioners initially adopted a traditional human-
rights approach, and only later transitioned to incorporate conflict 
resolution strategies. These projects were run under the auspices of 
nongovernmental organizations and involved James Cavallaro. 
Example three began as a conflict resolution project, but eventually 
hybridized in the opposite direction to address problematic attitudes 
about human rights within one or more of the stakeholder groups. 
Stephan Sonnenberg supervised the final project through the 
Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program at Harvard Law School. 
All three instances, however, strike us as recurring situations in 
which human rights advocates might fruitfully adopt a hybridized 
human rights and conflict resolution methodology in order to achieve 
their purposes. In our discussion of how such an approach functioned 
in each example, we highlight one prominent tension that we needed 
to address as a result of our hybridized practice. These tensions are 
crosscutting, and thus not associated exclusively with the type of 
scenario depicted in each case study. Following each case study, we 
provide a brief analysis of the potential benefits to our community 
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partners and to us as human rights practitioners of hybridizing our 
practice. 
IX. A HYBRIDIZED APPROACH AS ILLUSTRATED THROUGH OUR 
CASE STUDIES 
A. Case Study #1: Traditional Human Rights Advocacy Efforts are 
Successful and Your Counterpart Has a Change of Heart 
The first case study represents the dream of perhaps most human 
rights activists: after years of litigation and hard-fought advocacy, 
efforts finally pay off in the form of popular pressure for change, 
and/or an electoral defeat of the rights-offending regime, and a (new) 
government determined to clean house and effect positive change.
82
 
History shows that such opportunities come along only rarely, but 
that when they do, the long-term success of any reform efforts 
depends on the new government‘s ability to build robust social and 
political consensus around its new policy orientation.
83
 This would 
suggest, of course, that during such moments the human rights 
community should also respond by assuming a more supportive 
stance vis-à-vis the government‘s reform efforts, perhaps even 
partnering with the government to assist in translating its good 
intentions into reality.
84
 
 
 82. Since in this example it was the government of Maranhão that changed its approach 
towards issues of human rights abuse, we will continue to rely on a ―government-as- 
perpetrator‖ model throughout this example. This should not be taken to suggest, however, that 
the same dynamic is not also possible in the case of private targets of human rights campaigns, 
such as individuals or corporations responsible for rights violations. 
 83. Cf. Fiona Macaulay, Justice Sector and Human Rights Reform Under the Cardoso 
Government, 34 LATIN AM. PERSP., no. 5, 2007 at 26, 26 (describing the way in which Brazilian 
President Fernando Henrique‘s halfhearted efforts to improve Brazil‘s human rights efforts 
foundered due to ―local moral conservatives and producer groups acting as policy blockers 
rather than entrepreneurs‖). 
 84. Alicia Ely Yamin writes the following about the human rights community‘s 
traditionally adversarial stance vis-à-vis governments: 
[W]hile entirely appropriate at times, [it also] ignores the fact that sometimes it is not 
so much a question of what the state will not do, but (1) what it does not know how to 
do, or (2) what it cannot do because it is simply not the actor with the power to effect 
change. 
Yamin, supra note 17, at 1224. If true, such constraints of technical know-how or capacity are 
problems the human rights community can feasibly address. 
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Such moments, however, are rarely as crisp as the above example 
suggests. Usually it is quite difficult to tell whether the government‘s 
supposed change of heart is genuine. Accordingly, perhaps some 
skepticism is warranted about any purported one-hundred-eighty-
degree shifts by governments. And although government leadership 
might change, the bureaucracies they control tend to be more stable 
over time. Thus, the success of any reforms will depend crucially on 
how popular those reforms are with the bureaucrats asked to 
implement them (and quite possibly radically change their methods).  
Sadly, any miscalculations by an individual human rights 
advocate about the capacity of those in power to carry out their 
intended human rights reforms have serious costs. On a personal 
level, if the human rights advocate overestimates governmental good 
faith or capacity to change, she may be personally and professionally 
embarrassed by what in retrospect will appear to have been her 
naïveté. More importantly, misjudging the sincerity of government 
agents may prejudice the interests of the parties directly affected. For 
these reasons, human rights activists will likely be keenly aware of 
the downside risk of prematurely applauding a new government‘s 
change of heart, and tentative before lending any positive support to 
those in power. 
The first tension poses itself with regard to a hybridized model of 
human rights and conflict resolution advocacy, namely that in some 
cases the advocate herself must balance her justified (but hopefully 
not too cynical) skepticism of the reformist claims by those in power 
with her idealistic (but hopefully not too naïve) desire to support 
governments determined to promote human rights. In this Article we 
refer to this tension as that of justified skepticism of power brokers 
versus the desire to reward good intentions (skepticism versus 
optimism). 
In this case, this tension played out within the team of rights 
activists themselves during the negotiations. When the issue of 
adjusting the pensions paid to victims‘ next of kin arose, disputes 
over which measure of inflation to use surfaced. Advocates for the 
families sought the most favorable of the measures—the one that 
would result in the highest payout to the families. The main 
representative for the State insisted, however, that another, a less 
generous measure, be used. In a sidebar conference, he confided to 
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one of the lawyers in the delegation representing the victims that he 
had strict, nonnegotiable instructions on this point. The 
representatives for the victims had to decide—on the spot—if their 
counterpart was acting in good faith when he insisted that the entire 
settlement package would collapse if victims‘ representatives pressed 
for a different measure. Within the team of attorneys for the victims, 
comments focused on the fear of being manipulated by the state 
agents, the lack of trust, and the instinctive opposition to any state 
argument. Cynicism at first outweighed idealism, but after a heated 
discussion, the latter prevailed, agreement was reached, and 
compensation paid using the inflation index proposed by the state 
representatives. 
Addressing this tension relies crucially on the rights advocate‘s 
ability to communicate effectively both across the table (with those in 
power) and behind the table (with her constituency) about the slow 
process of establishing trust.  
1. Managing the Tension with Regard to Those in Power 
As we described above, the downside risk of being naïve in such 
situations is very real for the human rights advocate and her 
constituency. That said, the risk of skeptically dismissing the efforts 
of a new reform-oriented government is equally real.  
Assuming that a government‘s commitment to human rights 
reform is in fact genuine—as was the case in Maranhão—their 
political situation is typically a precarious one. Not only must such 
governments typically guard against their detractors‘ efforts—
sometimes violent and almost always insidious—to undermine any 
reforms, they must also deliver on the numerous other policy agendas 
inherent in governing, such as economic and social stability and 
national security. Governments that change policies in ways that 
advance human rights generally expect public recognition of their 
measures by rights activists. It is therefore very important for the 
rights advocate to signal her genuine appreciation for the changed 
governmental policy vis-à-vis human rights. Rights activists must 
take care to acknowledge the changed nature of the human rights 
situation and carefully avoid arbitrarily perpetuating an ―us versus 
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them‖ approach towards government actors during negotiations to 
address human rights problems. 
Furthermore, the rights advocate can signal a clear eagerness to 
reciprocate the government‘s change in heart. She can make it clear 
that any initial hesitation to collaborate openly is not coming from a 
principled aversion to such collaboration and support, but rather from 
a more understandable need for increased initial trust-building. A 
clear message to that effect also serves to initiate a problem-solving 
conversation about how to move forward with precisely such a trust-
building agenda. Perhaps there are some very high-profile human 
rights issues that—if resolved in a fair and genuine manner—might 
clearly signal the government‘s change in policy. Such was the case 
in Maranhão, where human rights activists and the government could 
agree to a friendly settlement in a high-profile case with significant 
repercussion at the local, national and even international level.  
Jointly identifying such opportunities for high-impact measures to 
signify changes in policy can also redefine the relationship between 
civil society and government. In Maranhão, channels of 
communication opened up in a way that did not exist prior to the 
engagement process around the São Luís killings. This becomes 
crucially important when—as is almost always the case—even a pro-
human rights government must set limits on the resources it can 
devote to address the human rights abuse of its predecessor 
government.  
2. Managing the Tension with Regard to Your Constituency 
All of this gradual trust-building with the new government 
authorities must be complemented by a parallel communication effort 
with the rights advocate‘s constituency, usually the stakeholder 
groups most visibly affected by past rights abuse. Any rapprochement 
with the new government needs to be carefully discussed with these 
stakeholders. Almost all complex negotiations entail compromises, 
tradeoffs, and creative problem-solving on both sides that lead to 
some bridging of the gap between the initial demands of the various 
parties. While this search for common ground may make absolute 
sense to those at the negotiating table, it might appear suspect to 
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those stakeholders not participating directly in the negotiations, 
especially if the process is shrouded in secrecy. 
Each setting requires its own means of engaging affected parties 
in the negotiation process. For example, in a refugee camp setting, 
one of the authors developed an ongoing outreach strategy built 
around specially recruited and trained communication point-persons 
who had previously expressed their interest in taking on a more 
activist role in giving their community a greater voice. The NGO 
driving this effort brought together these community activists to brief 
them in weekly meetings about the ongoing negotiations to roll out a 
major community dispute management project, news of which they 
were expected to circulate informally in the community to keep their 
neighbors and friends fully informed. In another project that one of 
the authors supervised, the outreach strategy had to keep some 20,000 
workers at a factory in southern China apprised of the negotiations.
85
 
In this situation, the author and his colleagues relied on several large 
public meetings to which all interested workers were invited. In other 
situations in which target constituents have widespread Internet 
access, blogs, email list-serves, and other forms of social networking 
might be most appropriate.  
Finally, in our third case study from sub-Saharan Africa, the 
conveners created role-play simulations that drew on popular 
television soap opera scripts to introduce community members to the 
language and theory of negotiation. Crucial in this regard is that the 
communication channels established between the human rights 
advocates and their constituencies allow information to pass in both 
directions. Communication from affected stakeholders to the human 
rights advocates may, of course, use the same channels established to 
report on progress at the negotiation table. But advocates may also 
proactively solicit such communication. For example, they may 
initiate focus groups with randomly-selected stakeholders to learn the 
―interests‖ of their constituent community, principles of the 
community that should not be violated, and ways in which they might 
 
 85. See generally CAROLINE REES, CSR INITIATIVE, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, 
PILOTING PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE COMPANY-STAKEHOLDER GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS: A 
REPORT OF LESSONS LEARNED at Annex E (May 23, 2011), available at http://www.hks 
.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/report_46_GM_pilots.pdf.  
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envision putting their past trauma to rest. To understand more fully 
the limits of their negotiation mandate, representatives might also get 
a good sense of the types of conditions that—according to their 
constituency—would make continuing with a collaborative approach 
inappropriate, and discuss how to handle this situation if and when it 
were to arise. Finally, any representative should discuss with her 
constituency how to make crucial decisions along the road, and 
whom to involve in any such decision.  
3. Advantages of Hybridized Approach in This Context 
From the Maranhão example we can identify several tentative 
advantages of the hybridized human rights and conflict resolution 
approach in situations where the traditional targets of an advocacy 
effort have a change of heart subsequent to a successful advocacy 
campaign.  
First, the approach rewards ―good behavior‖ by governmental 
authorities. As described above, much of traditional human rights 
approach is focused on developing effective ―sticks‖ to deter bad 
behavior by those in power. But thinking in terms of both sticks and 
carrots, it is important also that human rights activists know when to 
transition away from the use of sticks and develop effective ―carrots‖ 
that might positively induce governments to promote human rights.  
At the same time, the strategy outlined above allows the human 
rights activist‘s constituency to set (and periodically reset) the outer 
bounds of its comfort zone with regard to a changing environment. 
This may be difficult for a human rights activist to accept, especially 
if she is personally tempted to respond either more warmly or more 
guardedly to the government‘s entreaties rather than her constituency. 
That said, by actively facilitating a confidential conversation with her 
constituents about when and how to let one‘s guard down in light of a 
changed government policy, the human rights activist removes her 
own ego from the calculation of risks associated with a changed 
strategy. She thereby aligns herself more closely with the constituents 
who ultimately have to bear the true costs of any miscalculations.  
Furthermore, by engaging in conversation with her constituents 
about what it would take to put their traumatic past to rest, the human 
rights activist kick-starts a longer-term psychological reorientation 
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process with her constituency away from an unhealthy (and 
inherently divisive) fixation on the past and towards a renewed focus 
on the future. Such a reorientation process is long and inevitably 
bumpy, and the rights activist should not assume easy enthusiasm for 
a ―new future‖ among her constituents. However, the engagement 
process she initiated can open the door for a good faith, reform-
oriented government to break pessimistic expectations and gradually 
alleviate formerly victimized groups‘ understandable fear of 
exploitation and further manipulation. Thus ironically, the human 
rights activist can ―deliver‖ to the government a very tangible long-
term ―carrot‖ in the form of an expanded constituency, and thereby 
directly contribute to the conflict resolution agenda of cementing 
reforms and beginning to reconcile a splintered society. 
B. Case Study #2: Traditional Human Rights Advocacy Efforts are 
Either Unsuccessful or Less Successful and Collaborative 
Negotiation Represents the Best (Or Only) Way Forward 
The guarded transition from cynicism to idealism can be 
contrasted with our second case study, in which an interest-based 
negotiation represents only the ―least bad‖86 option in a series of 
unpalatable or unfeasible advocacy options. This was the case when 
one of the authors represented a traditional community whose lands 
were threatened by a major development project. After years of 
engagement, strategies for securing the interests of the community 
led to stalemate. The case was pending, but immediate resolution was 
unlikely. Construction was reaching conclusion, adding to the anxiety 
of the soon-to-be displaced traditional landowners. Negotiations over 
the years with individual landowners and some of the communities 
had produced mixed results at best. Many residents in the 
communities doubted the good faith of the company and of the 
government, with ample reason.  
 
 86. While from a strictly grammatical standpoint the ―least bad‖ advocacy option is 
tantamount to calling it the ―best‖ advocacy option, we chose in this Article to use the first term 
to underscore the thoroughly unsatisfying nature of this strategy and its expected outcomes, 
despite it being the best way forward for the community given the circumstances. 
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Deciding to negotiate with the company in this situation 
represented the least-bad of all remaining options, but was certainly 
not an ideal strategy. The clinic worried that the company would 
negotiate in bad faith (as they had responded to other advocacy 
efforts in the past), and they suspected strongly that the company 
would agree to compensate former landowners as a way to ―get rid of 
the problem,‖ not out of a true conviction that the traditional 
community deserved to be made whole again. The negotiation 
strategy also had no foreseeable way of satisfying the underlying 
grievance, nor was it likely to establish a sense of right and wrong 
about what happened to the community. Thus, engaging with the 
Corporation to achieve at least some form of modest monetary 
compensation and resettlement assistance represented a viable option. 
Given this context, a second tension presents itself for the human 
rights practitioner: that of signaling continued competence versus 
initiating a new collaborative approach (signaling strength versus 
inviting collaboration).  
As with the first case study, in this case too the rights advocate 
must carefully signal—both across the table and behind the table—
the change in role that a shift from an adversarial stance to a more 
interest-based one entails. A crucial difference, however, is that at the 
time when circumstances force the human rights activist into a ―least 
bad‖ negotiation effort, usually neither the activists‘ constituency nor 
the counter-party are particularly excited about the strategy. To 
compound the tensions, the Corporation hesitated in responding to 
the clinic‘s invitation to negotiate, especially as the request was 
coming from the very lawyers who were still pursuing a potentially 
damaging human rights campaign against the company.  
The remainder of this section considers the type of problem and 
the challenges it presents in the abstract. The recommendations are 
based at least as much on our errors and shortcomings in these and 
other matters as on our successes. 
To convince stakeholders both behind the table and across the 
table to participate in a good faith negotiation effort, the human rights 
activist must retain the respect of all involved stakeholders while also 
transitioning roles and strategies. Given that respect in an adversarial 
setting frequently depends on the human rights activist‘s perceived 
competence, confidence, and strength, it is these qualities in 
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particular that the activist must continue to exude while arguing for a 
more collaborative approach. 
1. Managing the Tension with Regard to Those Across the Table 
In the case above—as in many other situations on the bumpy road 
of defending human rights—the turn to negotiation of at least a 
marginally satisfactory outcome came only after a series of setbacks 
and defeats in other judicial or political forums that might have 
promised a more gratifying outcome for the victims. It is nonetheless 
important, however, not to frame the turn to negotiation as a result of 
exhaustion or failure.  
Instead, a human rights activist can frame it as an invitation to the 
other side to change tactics with reference to idealistic aspirations. 
This reframe need not be merely rhetorical window dressing, 
however. Indeed, in many situations, collaboration and cooperation in 
the quest for a sustainable negotiated outcome may be more closely 
aligned with the culture and preferences of the societies with which 
rights activists are working, not to mention more professionally 
satisfying to the rights activist herself.
87
 
The rights activist should also not immediately abandon all 
adversarial tactics, even if the decision to shift approaches has 
already been made.
88
 Instead, the activist can propose clear 
conditions under which an adversarial strategy will be relaxed and 
ultimately abandoned. These conditions should focus primarily on 
 
 87. In this Article we consciously avoid the question whether an interest-based approach 
would always be preferable to the more adversarial strategies we initially used in this case 
study. According to a ―purist‖ conflict resolution approach, interest-based strategies of dispute 
resolution are always preferable to rights-or power-based solutions. See WILLIAM L. URY, 
JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 15 (1988) (―To 
sum up, we argue that, in general, reconciling interests is less costly than determining who is 
right, which in turn is less costly than determining who is more powerful.‖). However, there are 
many countervailing examples indicating that in many situations—in particular those in which 
rights and principles are at stake—a rights-based approach may indeed be worth the effort. See, 
e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–90 (1984). 
 88. This recommendation relies on the assumption that the adversarial strategies still 
entail some potential future costs for the counterpart, and therefore abandoning them is not yet 
considered inevitable by all stakeholders. When this is not the case, it makes little sense to hold 
out the gradual cessation of an adversarial approach as a carrot for a more collaborative attitude 
by the counterpart. 
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company acts that might pave the way toward a more collaborative 
approach, such as non-binding joint brainstorming sessions, joint 
fact-finding missions, trust-building measures, or other acts 
signifying a change in relationship.  
Even so, the rights advocate should expect a long and uphill 
struggle to convince a counterpart to engage in a more collaborative 
process—especially if the counterpart has a track record of acting in 
bad faith. 
Finally, an across-the-table strategy in a negotiation that begins in 
difficult circumstances requires making it very easy for the 
counterpart to accept a negotiated outcome—with very limited 
creativity or effort on their part. For the rights advocate, this is a 
thankless task. At the same time, it also represents the best chance of 
success when the only objective is to secure something rather than 
nothing for a constituent community. 
2. Managing the Tension with Regard to Your Constituency 
Managing the transition from a strategy built on vindicating 
justice toward a more utilitarian strategy of securing at least some 
compensation for a victimized community requires the human rights 
practitioner to manage expectations carefully with her constituency 
behind the table.  
As in our first example, the rights advocate must maintain a 
transparent discussion about the expected benefits and drawbacks of 
a continued adversarial approach versus a more collaborative 
negotiated approach. Even if the choice appears clear to the rights 
advocate, the community still needs to have the ultimate say in any 
such significant decision. Failure to achieve consensus about strategy 
behind the table can lead to divisions within the coalition—divisions 
that are easy to exploit by a bad-faith but astute counterpart. 
To begin building such a consensus, the rights activist should 
communicate her view to her constituency that the advocacy effort 
stands at a crucial juncture, and furthermore insist that the 
community as a whole needs to make a decision about what to do 
next. The advocate might even encourage the community to seek 
outside advice on the matter, and give the community ample time to 
discuss the situation on its own, without even the perception of 
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influence by the advocate. In such matters especially, human rights 
advocates are wise to resist invitations by the community simply to 
let the human rights ―expert‖ decide. Not only do such invitations 
devalue the crucial input of local stakeholders, but they also foster a 
disempowering narrative by which the victims of past rights abuse 
are again dependent on others to decide their fate. Instead, the rights 
activist can use such critical moments to begin re-empowering the 
community, and to re-invest them with agency over their own fates. 
To encourage such agency, the advocate might help design a 
consultation process that will solicit the wider community‘s input, 
such as a series of focus groups, open fora, or consultations leading 
up to a final decision.  
Given this potential for the crucial trust between a human rights 
advocate and her constituency to erode in such situations, it is 
important to discuss ex ante a clear communication protocol, and to 
set strong expectations of reciprocal transparency between the 
community and its representatives. Advocates should make it very 
clear that their representation depends crucially on the continued trust 
of the community. From the perspective of the negotiator, this means 
that the time and energy spent clarifying questions or concerns—even 
small ones—and keeping a strong, common understanding of strategy 
and objectives is well worth the security of not having to later patch 
up a damaged relationship. Establishing healthy internal 
communication habits is especially important in the face of 
unscrupulous counterparts who might otherwise seek to exploit any 
communication gaps and to divide a fragmented constituency. 
3. Advantages of Hybridized Approach in This Context 
In cases in which a shift in strategy is initiated by the victimized 
stakeholder community and no advocacy methodology offers a 
panacea, which strategy to pursue seems more like a choice for a 
―least bad‖ strategy rather than a ―best‖ one. The hybridized 
approach serves to bring a community closer together precisely at a 
time when the potential for mutual finger-pointing and acrimony is 
greatest. By insisting that the community consider carefully the pros 
and cons of any potential strategy shift, the rights advocate can force 
the community to take a step back, reassess the situation, and decide 
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collectively on a new strategy. Best yet, by insisting that this 
conversation take place without undue time pressure and before any 
decisions have yet been made, the rights activist can ensure that the 
agency for any changes in strategy stays where it belongs—with the 
community itself. Finally, building consensus in this way, and being 
very detailed about the implications of a new strategy, can enhance 
the cohesion of advocacy efforts. 
C. Case Study #3: Your Own Constituency is Itself Partially 
Contributing to a Human Rights Problem 
Our final case study illustrates a very different challenge from the 
first two. In case study three, a human rights activist confronts the 
realization that at least part of the blame for ongoing human rights 
violations sometimes lies within one‘s own constituent communities. 
The example is not one in which a human rights advocate 
consciously agrees to take up the case of a potentially repugnant 
individual (such as a child abuser, defendant in a genocide trial, or 
proponent of violent racist ideology) to defend an important human 
rights principle such as free speech or the right to be free from cruel 
and inhuman treatment.
89
 Instead, through this case study, we seek to 
address ambiguous situations in which the conduct of parties involves 
shades of gray.  
An illustration of this might be the way in which the 1992–1995 
Bosnian war is typically depicted today, twenty years later. A 
dominant narrative among western commentators considers the 
Bosnian-Serbs as the perpetrators and the Bosnian Muslims as the 
victims of that conflict (and perhaps the Bosnian-Croatians as 
confused bystanders). In fact, the reality of the situation was much 
more complicated, with each side simultaneously both victimizer and 
victim of the others.
90
 So too was the situation in Rwanda, where the 
 
 89. Take, for example, the ACLU‘s controversial defense of the right of the Illinois 
Nazis—a subgroup of the National Socialist Party of America—to stage a march through 
Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago. See Irving Louis Horowitz & 
Victoria Curtis Bramson, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic Theory, 43 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 328, 329 (1979). 
 90. See Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-Related Deaths in the 1992-1995 Armed 
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21 
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international community‘s efforts to assign blame for the horrific 
1994 genocide suppressed discussion of the widespread war crimes 
perpetrated by the invading Tutsi rebels as they sought to reestablish 
control of the country and root out remaining Hutu radicals.
91
 
This same complexity is also often present in smaller-scale human 
rights advocacy efforts, for example, in our third case study. In that 
example, human rights activists who traditionally focused on 
shaming major multinational extractive companies with operations in 
one particularly conflict-ridden sub-Saharan African country and 
pressuring them to adopt more stringent safeguards against rights 
abuse found themselves focusing on the corruption and sexism within 
their own constituent communities.  
The eventual decision by an extractive company to provide direct 
development assistance to communities affected by its operations, 
and the disappointment that ensued when these efforts proved 
unsuccessful, provided the impetus for this shift in focus. The failure 
in the negotiations between communities and the Corporation was 
due in part to the corruption of the community representatives, who 
were supposed to represent their neighbors‘ interests during 
negotiations with the multinational. The elders who typically 
negotiated agreements with the multinational were almost always 
older men and therefore less connected to the needs of women and 
youth. Furthermore, they typically directed resources towards other 
members of their own tribes or clans, rather than to the entire 
communities they were supposedly representing. 
For the human rights activists, this situation presented a serious 
challenge. First, to accuse longstanding allies of corruption, sexism, 
and discrimination was awkwardly dissonant with past advocacy 
efforts in which they had described these same communities as 
 
EUR. J. POPULATION 187, 189 (2005) (―The war in Bosnia . . . comprised several episodes, 
including such as those with Serb perpetrators and Muslim (or Croat) victims, with Croat 
perpetrators and Muslim (or Serb) victims, as well as with Muslim perpetrators and Serb (or 
Croat) victims. At one point there was even a Muslim-Muslim conflict.‖).  
 91. See, e.g., ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE 
STORY 535–59 (1999). But cf. Philip Verwimp, Testing the Double Genocide Thesis for Central 
and Southern Rwanda, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 423, 441 (2003) (―[T]he term genocide should 
be reserved for the killings committed by the Interahamwe and the FAR, and another word 
should be used for the killings committed by the RPF. That word could be massacre or terror or 
another word, depending on the event.‖). 
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―innocent victims‖ of corporate abuse. Thus, this new advocacy 
agenda targeting prominent members of those very same 
communities had the potential to undermine the credibility of those 
earlier allegations, and the NGO as a whole. Second, the NGOs were 
contemplating to address the human-rights-inconsistent attitudes of 
the very same elders with whom they had worked in the past to 
document the abuses of the extractive companies, and upon whom 
their continued access to the communities depended.  
In such situations it is incumbent on the human rights activist to 
develop strategies for engaging with this cognitive dissonance in a 
clear-headed way without needlessly jeopardizing the continued 
working relationship. Simply to look the other way in such situations 
may be tempting in the short-term, but such a response may 
undermine the credibility of the human rights advocate, and it 
ultimately fails to address the underlying problem. Similarly, the 
temptation to walk away from any such relationship in principled 
indignation is equally unlikely to promote change. Rather, the rights 
activist is best counseled to manage the tension between maintaining 
a strong relationship with community partners and encouraging those 
partners to be introspective and critical of their own failings 
(maintaining relationships versus demanding critical self-analysis).  
To some extent, this constitutes a particularly difficult 
conversation between partners, which is the subject of voluminous 
negotiation and conflict resolution literature too extensive to review 
in this Article.
92
 Influencing a traditional ally to change her attitude, 
however, is a complicated and often philosophically fraught task. It is 
difficult to influence others‘ deeply-held attitudes. Furthermore, one 
might question what authority and legitimacy that a human rights 
advocate—often an outsider to a community—should claim to seek 
such attitudinal change among her community counterparts. Is it not a 
 
 92. See, e.g., Lisa Stanford, Dissatisfied Lawyers Leaving Practice for Other Pursuits, 
NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR ASSOCIATION (DEC. 15, 2000), available at http://www.nhbar.org/ 
publications/archives/display-news-issue.asp?id=29. Stanford describes the adversarial nature 
of the practice of law as one of the primary motives for lawyers to change professions, or see 
Janine Robben, Burnout Cautionary Tales, OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN (Oct. 2008), 
available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/08oct/burnout.html, in which Robbin 
cites the results of a survey administered by the Oregon Attorney Assistance Program finding 
that 42 percent of Oregon lawyers said the adversarial nature of their jobs was dissatisfying. 
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manifestation of cultural imperialism for an outsider to evaluate 
others‘ innermost attitudes, practices, and beliefs? These are vexing 
but crucially important philosophical questions that each human 
rights practitioner should carefully consider before launching herself 
into this career. Full examination of these questions, sadly, is beyond 
the scope of this Article.
93
 
That said, it is less ethically questionable for a human rights 
activist to choose carefully with whom to partner and to revisit such 
decisions in light of new information about those counterparts and 
their beliefs. It is therefore not unreasonable to explore the depth and 
resistance to change of rights-inconsistent attitudes among one‘s 
partners, as described below, to understand whether a traditional 
partnership is worth maintaining in the long-term. 
1. Managing This Tension 
As alluded to above, rarely do human rights activists have the 
standing to demand that their counterparts change their attitudes. 
Even if they do have such standing, demanding change is likely 
indefensible. Further, activists‘ demands (if presented as such) are 
unlikely to produce more than a thin veneer of ―political correctness‖ 
masking essentially unchanged attitudes. Thus, the best strategies are 
those that allow the counterparts themselves to reevaluate their 
attitudes. 
Our entry point into this project was consciously to ―other‖ a 
source of outside pressure—in this case the Corporation‘s insistence 
that it would only continue providing development funds if they 
actually reached their intended beneficiaries. This way, we were able 
to broach the sensitive topics of the elders‘ perceived insensitivity 
towards (or ignorance of) the needs of women, youth, and minorities 
in their communities without the elders perceiving the project as a 
personal attack or a critique of traditional practices. We drew 
 
 93. For three particularly poignant examples, see Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims and 
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT‘L. L.J. 201 (2001); Binyavanga 
Wainaina, How to Write About Africa, GRANTA, http://www.granta.com/Magazine/92/How-to-
Write-about-Africa/Page-1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); and Ivan Illich, Speech at Meeting of 
the National Society for Internships and Experimental Education, To Hell With Good Intentions 
(1968), available at http://www.swaraj.org/illich_hell.htm.  
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explicitly on the image of two problem solvers sitting side by side on 
the same side of a table, facing a common problem, as opposed to the 
image of two negotiators glaring at each other across the table. We 
hoped to position ourselves side-by-side with the elders in a joint 
problem-solving effort to keep the development funds flowing.  
Of course, in so doing we were consciously using the Corporation 
and its demands as a crude proxy for the ―real‖ stakeholders with an 
interest in holding the elders more accountable. These ―real‖ 
stakeholders included women, youth, and tribal outsiders in the 
communities, as well as the Human Rights NGOs themselves. Our 
fear, however, was that had we been more direct we would implicitly 
frame the elders as standing in opposition to members of their own 
community, and that by doing so we might have actually exacerbated 
the conflict and led to an even more defensive posture by the elders.  
Since ―othering‖ the Corporation bore its own reputational costs–
especially for the Corporation—our partners went to great lengths in 
advance of the project to reach agreement with our counterparts in 
the Corporation over the strategy. The Corporation agreed that in 
order for their development efforts to succeed, the relationship 
between the elders and their constituencies had to be strengthened—
not weakened—and that for the NGOs to be agents of constructive 
change, their relationship with the elders also had to proceed on the 
basis of trust.  
Furthermore, our counterparts at the Corporation understood that 
their role as an actor with significant resources was functionally 
different from that of the NGOs, which typically brought only 
minimal resources into the community. Put simply, the Corporation 
and the NGOs both agreed that the elders would be more likely to 
consider changing their corrupt behavior in the face of an ultimatum 
from the Corporation than they would be in the face of NGO 
lobbying or grassroots pressure from below. Ignoring the 
Corporation‘s demands in such a situation would have entailed 
potentially greater costs to the elders than beginning to consider 
grudgingly the needs of women, youth, and minorities in their 
community. For this very reason, the Corporation supported us even 
as we framed it and its inflexible ultimatum as the primary reason 
why the elders might consider changing their behavior. Needless to 
say, such a framing also played into hand of the public relations unit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/9
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of the Corporation, which could use this scenario as an illustration of 
how the Corporation stood up for human rights principles. 
Once we gained entry into the issue with the elders and positioned 
ourselves as their partners, we gained their consent to convene a 
cross-section of representative stakeholders for an exploratory 
workshop. In addition to the elders, we invited articulate women, 
young people, and minorities (often already active in issue-based 
NGOs) and even negotiators from the Corporation to attend the 
workshop—all in their personal capacities. Since nothing was being 
decided at these meetings, and since few of the attendees actually 
lived in the same communities, the elders saw this as a largely non-
threatening opportunity to hear the views of others and to 
demonstrate publicly their openness to addressing the issue—no 
doubt a message they wanted to send loudly to the participants from 
the Corporation who were also present. 
In preparation for the workshop, our clinic developed a series of 
specially designed simulations and structured debriefs to open the 
door to a critical and reflective analysis of the situation. These 
simulations were designed to make taboos explicit, and to allow 
participants to discuss them in a simulated and therefore much safer 
role-play environment.
94
 For example, we designed a negotiation 
simulation where one of the negotiators had grown accustomed to 
receiving bribes and demanded a substantial ―sweetener‖ in the 
context of a business negotiation. This simulation—which was 
structurally similar to the negotiations the elders were used to with 
the extractive Corporation, but contextually distinct—proved to be an 
effective entry point for discussions about different perspectives on 
bribes and contrasting attitudes about how business and power should 
be regulated.  
By randomly ascribing roles to the participants regardless of their 
roles in ―real life,‖ we were also able to create a much more visceral 
sense of empathy across the different roles than we might have had 
 
 94. We are struck by the significant contributions of Jennifer Brown‘s excellent article on 
the use of simulations to ―teach‖ empathy in this volume, and encourage the reader to see that 
article for its discussion. Jennifer Brown, Deeply Contacting the Inner World of Another: 
Practicing Empathy in Values-Based Negotiation Role Plays, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y __ 
(2012).  
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we only led a straightforward discussion of the issue. Often we would 
find that this empathy produced an entirely different discussion after 
the simulation—one in which the participants were visibly processing 
the emotions, reactions, and feelings they had experienced during the 
simulation.  
Much of the facilitated discussion following the simulations was 
geared towards an exploration of what might be considered ―fair‖ 
when representing a community. Over time, these workshops and 
others like it led to a gradual redefinition of the relationship between 
communities and their elder representatives, and even the explicit 
inclusion of women, minorities, and young people in the negotiation 
process with the Corporation.
95
  
2. Advantages of Hybridized Approach in This Context 
As discussed above, human rights activists often find themselves 
captured by their own ―naming and shaming‖ narrative in which the 
world must inevitably be portrayed as a contest between good and 
evil, perpetrator and victim. Turning away from this simplified 
narrative and addressing problematic behavior on the part of 
traditional allies is therefore a complicated task.  
As this example shows, some creative maneuvering and 
coordinated framing of issues with other stakeholders can allow 
human rights activists to address the shortcomings even of their 
partners—something that is necessary if activists wish to avoid 
undermining their own credibility as impartial defenders of human 
rights. Successfully partnering with the community elders to 
―placate‖ the Corporation in our case actually allowed the human 
rights activists to strengthen their relationship with their partnered 
elders, all while mitigating the underlying human rights problems 
they had identified among their traditional allies. 
Ironically, the interaction also served to strengthen the trust the 
elders felt towards the human rights NGOs. At the end of the process 
 
 95. To be clear, this was a multi-year effort, and progress was incremental. The Harvard 
Negotiation and Mediation Clinic‘s involvement with the project lasted for only a few months 
of that overall process and focused on the development of the simulations and facilitated 
debriefings, thus we cannot claim credit for the overall success of this longer-term project.  
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the elders realized that they had managed simultaneously to improve 
their relationship with their communities while also unlocking greater 
sources of funding to reinforce their role as community leaders. The 
NGOs also came away from this collaboration with greater faith in 
their elder counterparts. Experiencing firsthand the elders‘ receptivity 
to change—and in fact their enthusiasm about a more inclusive 
definition of community—reinforced for the NGOs the wisdom in 
partnering with the elders in their ongoing efforts to bring positive 
change to the Niger Delta region.  
X. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION CLINIC AT STANFORD 
The above case studies and much of the reflections stem from the 
authors‘ previous experience with NGOs and in supervising clinical 
projects through either a human rights clinic or a conflict resolution 
clinic.
96
 Each of the projects forced those involved to engage with 
elements of both disciplines, or at least to recognize the limits of a 
single discipline to respond effectively. The analysis above considers 
how the teams managed the tensions arising in the context of the 
hybridized projects while also identifying challenges and lessons 
learned. 
We leave it to others to assess whether these examples might 
serve as ―best practices‖ or even ―good practices.‖ We certainly 
learned significant lessons from each experience. As importantly, we 
are aware of a number of ways that we might improve our approach 
were we to engage in the projects over again. 
Undoubtedly, there are other contexts in which a hybridized 
approach can be relevant. Above, we note that one major area in 
which such an approach might prove particularly relevant is the 
 
 96. Specifically, the Harvard International Human Rights Clinic, then under the 
Directorship of Professor James Cavallaro, and the Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical 
Program, where Stephan Sonnenberg at the time was active as Clinical Instructor and Lecturer 
on Law. International Human Rights Clinic, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard 
.edu/programs/hrp/ihrc.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); Harvard Negotiation and Mediation 
Clinical, Program, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/ 
hnmcp/web/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
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progressive realization of social, economic, and cultural rights.
97
 
Indeed, both of the authors have been involved in projects aiming to 
secure such rights in which this assertion has been borne out. Thus, 
our selection of the three case studies above should by no means be 
confused with a full typology of situations in which a hybridized 
approach can be relevant. We must leave this topic to future 
scholarship and to the accumulated wisdom of our clinic once it has 
been running for a significant period of time. 
We contend that the three tensions we highlighted are potentially 
applicable for all types of hybridized human rights and conflict 
resolution projects. Thus, although we introduced each tension in the 
context of a case study, this does not imply that this tension arises 
only in scenarios similar to the ones profiled above. 
One theme that we noted across each of our case studies is 
stakeholder empowerment. In fact, we contend that stakeholder 
empowerment is one of the particular strengths of a hybridized 
human rights and conflict resolution practice. We also considered the 
issue of rights prioritization in contexts with many rights violations. 
Limited resources often force rights advocates to make difficult 
tradeoffs about which rights to pursue actively and which to ignore 
temporarily. Inevitably, such decisions leave those claiming forgotten 
rights feeling abandoned and neglected, as though their claims were 
of lesser importance. And yet the prioritization of objectives in light 
of limited resources is also not a tension at all, but rather a challenge 
that any activist—not just human rights practitioners—faces on a 
constant basis. In our view, a consensus-building strategy can help 
address this challenge, so that the individual human rights 
practitioner can rely on her partners in the community, rather than on 
herself, to make these difficult decisions.
98
 
One important tension inherent in any effort to merge human 
rights and conflict resolution involves the potential threat to the 
reputation of professionals from each camp. Thus, if a human rights 
practitioner is reputed as a result of one particularly adversarial 
 
 97. See Yamin, supra note 17. 
 98. We recognize, of course, that often the decision about which right or rights to pursue 
in a given context is driven as much by the mandate restrictions of particular NGOs or 
associations as they are by the views of those on the ground. 
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project to be a fierce advocate on behalf of her clients, it might be 
difficult for that practitioner—even if she has very high skills as a 
facilitator—to attract the attention of someone seeking a consensus 
builder/facilitator. In this same way, a facilitator reputed to be 
particularly skillful at building bridges between victims and offenders 
in reconciliation processes may have difficulty gaining the trust of a 
client or community seeking a zealous advocate. Thus there might be 
a tension between keeping one‘s ―toolbox‖ large, as it were, and 
simultaneously developing a reputation based on past projects. This 
tension may be diffused by a clear definition of the role and objective 
of a hybrid practitioner in each particular engagement. Thus, a hybrid 
practitioner may engage as a facilitator in one context and as an 
advocate in another. Provided she is clear and transparent about her 
role at the beginning of and throughout the engagement, she should 
be able to retain her professional reputation. The ability to engage in 
multiple, synergistic but methodologically distinct practice areas is 
common among those in the practice of law. We contend that 
hybridized human rights and conflict resolution can also operate 
successfully in methodologically distinct practice areas.
99
 
Before concluding, we return to our attempt to merge these two 
foundational approaches in a new clinic at Stanford Law School. The 
projects we select for our new clinic, and the pedagogy we develop to 
provide students a robust grounding in the skills and theory of such a 
hybridized practice, are still very much a work in progress. Over 
time, we hope to continue revisiting our analysis, and to build a more 
robust theory of hybridized human rights and conflict resolution 
practice. 
A. Pedagogy and Structure of the Clinic 
At Stanford Law School, clinics are full-time, quarter-length 
commitments.
100
 This means that students enrolled in clinics have no 
 
 99. While we believe this to be true in the case of clinics and relatively small NGOs, it is 
at least subject to doubt whether such an approach could work for a very high-profile NGO 
such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, to name two prominent examples, 
given their already cemented reputations as reputable, but quintessentially ―traditional,‖ human 
rights NGOs in the way we defined such a practice above. 
 100. See Larry Kramer, Stanford Law School Dean: We Aim to Teach our Students Not 
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competing classes, no other finals or papers, and no competing 
daytime extra-curricular commitments to limit full-time commitment 
to the clinic. This clinic thus becomes an intense experience, much 
like a small NGO, but with time and space for reflection. The quarter 
is launched with an intense ―boot camp‖ in which we present students 
with theory and skills training necessary to complete their projects. 
This ―boot camp‖ relies heavily on simulation-based learning, 
focusing on human rights skills such as fact-finding, media advocacy, 
and report writing, as well as on conflict resolution skills such as 
active listening, conflict analysis, and study of interest-based 
approaches to resolving conflict. The seminar readings accompanying 
the clinic focus on critical analysis of both the human rights and the 
conflict resolution approaches. The readings and class discussions 
seek to disabuse students of the notion that human rights practitioners 
can do no harm by virtue of their altruistic noble intentions, while 
providing some insight on how to advance rights even in light of 
these critiques. Once this initial ―boot camp‖ is over, the seminar 
transitions to lessons from the experiences students have in their 
clinical projects. 
B. The Clinic’s Projects 
As noted above, there exists a potential tension between the types 
of projects a hybridized human rights and conflict resolution practice 
accepts and its ability to continue to attract a diverse range of 
projects. The risk is that any one high-profile project can prove 
―sticky‖ and make it increasingly unlikely for the clinic to attract 
anything but similar projects again in the future.  
As mentioned above, we believe that by being very explicit with 
clients, students, and colleagues about what type of approach we are 
using in each project, and resisting pressure from either our human 
rights or conflict resolution colleagues to employ only one 
methodology at the expense of the other, our clinic can maintain and 
build on its reputation as a place where both methods can coexist. 
Thus, we can—and indeed should—take both ―pure‖ conflict 
 
Just to Spot Problems, But to Solve Them, LEGAL REBELS (Mar. 29, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/stanford_law_school_dean_larry_kramer/.  
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resolution and human rights projects as part of our mix of projects. 
Given the existing landscape in which these clinics are siloed, we do 
not elaborate in greater detail on these ―pure‖ human rights or 
conflict resolution projects. Of particular interest are those projects 
that draw actively on both methodologies: projects involving a 
―perpetrator‖ (or someone who is commonly described as such) 
seeking to improve his human rights record or ones in which 
adversarial strategies have stalled and new directions are sought. Or 
perhaps the Clinic might address a project in which there are no 
obvious perpetrators at all—only ―wicked‖ problems that need to be 
resolved if people are to enjoy their rights.
101
  
 
 101. While we also love the sound of this terminology on its own merits, ―wicked‖ 
problems were first defined by public planners to describe problems with the following 
characteristics: 
  The problem is ill-defined and resists clear definition as a technical issue, because 
wicked problems are also social, political, and moral in nature. Each proposed 
definition of the problem implies a particular kind of solution which is loaded 
with contested values. Consequently, merely defining the problem can incite 
passionate conflict.  
  Solutions to a wicked problem cannot be labeled good or bad; they can only be 
considered better or worse, good enough or not good enough. Whether a solution 
is good enough depends on the values and judgment of each of the parties, who 
will inevitably assess the problem and its potential solutions from their respective 
positions within the social context of the problem.  
  Every wicked problem is unique and novel, because even if the technical elements 
appear similar from one situation to another, the social, political, and moral 
features are context-specific.  
  A wicked problem contains an interconnected web of sub-problems; every 
proposed solution to part or the whole of the wicked problem will affect other 
problems in the web.  
  The only way to address a wicked problem is to try solutions; every solution we 
try is expensive and has lasting unintended consequences. So, although we have 
only one shot to solve this wicked problem, we will have plenty of opportunities 
to develop our skills as we deal with the wicked problems that we create with our 
attempted solutions. 
Christopher Honeyman & James Coben, Navigating Wickedness: A New Frontier in Teaching 
Negotiation, in VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM 439, 440 (Christopher Honeyman, 
James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2010) (citing Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, 
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL‘Y SCI.155 (1973); Tom Ritchey, Wicked 
Problems: Structuring Social Messes with Morphological Analysis, SWEDISH MORPHOLOGICAL 
SOCIETY, http://swemorph.com/pdf/wp.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); JEFFREY CONKLIN, 
DIALOGUE MAPPING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF WICKED PROBLEMS (2005)). 
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In addition to ensuring methodological diversity in our project 
mix, we also seek to secure projects focusing on not only civil and 
political rights, but also economic, social, and cultural rights. Finally, 
we seek to undertake projects in various regions of the world—
including the United States—to ensure that we tap into the wide 
variety of experiences human rights practitioners encounter.
102
 
A second aspect of our project selection is the process of 
contracting with potential clients or partners. Given that our 
hybridized approach to human rights is relatively novel, and one that 
entails methodological innovations not immediately apparent to a 
casual observer, we try to make sure that our partners understand 
thoroughly why we tend to approach projects the way we describe 
above, and what role they can (and should) play consistent with that 
approach. Not all clients seek the approach we use. Our strong sense, 
therefore, is that it is preferable to identify any disconnect in 
methodology or objectives for a project before the outset rather than 
after the project is already underway.  
Substantively, we prefer projects that require students to think 
creatively about how best to achieve maximum human-rights-
consistent outcomes—projects in which the ―best practice‖ manual 
may not yet be written. For this creative process to happen, we 
ideally look for partners who are themselves interested in the 
hybridized human rights and conflict resolution approach, and 
partners who are eager to engage in a reflective learning process. This 
helps us simultaneously meet our twin goals of teaching and learning 
human rights advocacy and conflict resolution while helping clients 
and communities advance their interests through high quality 
representation. 
 
 102. We will, however, limit our definition of rights to only those rights that must be 
claimed by a rights holder. Thus, for example, although efforts to provide charitable 
development assistance to an impoverished community certainly might work towards satisfying 
a right to economic security for the beneficiaries of that project, we would not conceive of that 
effort as a ―human rights project‖ per se. Partnering with that community, however, in an effort 
to assert and secure such economic security based on a rights claim, however, might well fall 
within our definition. 
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C. Criteria for Success 
Much of what is written above will be subject to ongoing learning 
and critical (re)evaluation as our experience grows. Thus, it is 
appropriate to end this Article with a brief description of four criteria 
by which we seek to evaluate ourselves. 
First, we hope to train our students to be more familiar with the 
methods, baseline assumptions, and above all the practical skills of 
both human rights and conflict resolution practitioners. Ample 
courses exist at Stanford and elsewhere that introduce students to 
these disciplines in a classroom setting. Rather than replicate these 
courses, we hope to whet students‘ appetites by engaging them in 
critical analysis and practical work in these areas. We hope as well to 
encourage students to pursue careers in this area. 
Second, we expect to be judged by how much we help our clients 
and affected stakeholders find sustainable solutions to their problems. 
Given the range of projects we might undertake, and the 
methodological dexterity we wish to retain, it may be hard to develop 
a better metric of all our projects‘ success (or failure) than the degree 
to which any action points coming out of the projects remain relevant 
once the project is complete. If a project‘s goal is to raise awareness 
about a certain human rights issue, for example, we might inquire 
whether that awareness proved to be lasting, or whether the sense of 
urgency dissipated again once the project was over. Similarly, if a 
project is intended to find a solution to an ongoing situation of labor 
violations, then it might be interesting to revisit that situation once 
some time has passed to see whether the solution proposed was 
indeed implemented, and if so, how it weathered the tests of time.  
Third, given our clinic‘s hybrid methodology, we hope that our 
intervention will lead to an improvement in the various stakeholders‘ 
capacity to manage future disputes or problems collaboratively. Thus, 
an important benchmark would be that the relationship between the 
parties improve or at least remains the same as before we began the 
project. This goal is important if it is true, as we believe, that the 
pursuit of human rights is entirely consistent with the pursuit of more 
peaceful societies.  
Fourth and finally, we envision our clinic as a laboratory of sorts 
for ongoing theory development, and a place where scholars and 
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practitioners alike can look for guidance on how to address situations 
of rights abuse that increasingly defy categorization as either a human 
rights problem or a conflict ripe for resolution. 
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